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Pressured into a Preference to Leave? A Study on
the “Specific” Deterrent Effects and Perceived
Legitimacy of Immigration Detention
Arjen Leerkes Mieke Kox
Immigration detention is formally not a punishment, but governments do use
it to deter illegal residence. This study examines whether and how immigration
detention affects detainees’ decision-making processes regarding departure,
thereby possibly resulting in de facto “specific deterrence.” Semistructured face-
to-face interviews were conducted in the Netherlands with 81 immigration
detainees, and their case files were examined. Evidence is found for a limited,
selective deterrence effect at the level of detainee’s attitudes: most respondents
considered immigration detention a painful and distressing experience, but
only a minority—mostly labor migrants without family ties in the Netherlands—
developed a preference to return to their country of citizenship in hopes of end-
ing their exposure, including repeated exposure, to the detention. In line with
defiance theory, we find that eventual deterrent effects mostly occurred among
detainees who also attributed some measure of legitimacy to their detention.
Among some detainees, the detention experience resulted in a preference to
migrate to a neighboring European country.
Immigration detention is an administrative measure to ensure
that migrants cannot abscond while preparations for deportation
are being made (see Cornelisse 2010; Wilsher 2012). Two main
types exist: (1) preadmission detention at the border, involving
foreigners not admitted to the state’s territory, and (2) pre-
expulsion detention of foreigners whose stay in the territory is,
has, or is likely to become unauthorized. Although formally not a
punishment, governments do use immigration detention to deter
unwanted immigrants from the territory (Campesi 2015, DeBono
2013; Hasselberg 2014; Kalhan 2010; Leerkes and Broeders
2010; Mainwaring 2012; Martin 2012; Pickering and Weber
2014). That claim rests on three main observations: (1) barring
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exceptions, detention occurs under regimes resembling criminal
imprisonment; (2) immigration detainees tend to experience the
detention as a kind of punishment, and (3) various policy makers
have publicly stated that immigration detention is meant to pres-
sure detainees into leaving. For example, in the Netherlands, the
country on which the present analysis focuses, a former Minister
of Immigration and Asylum argued that the purpose of immigra-
tion detention is to “incite to departure” (“prikkelen tot vertrek”)
(Parliamentary Documents II 2010/11, 19 637, no. 1396).
It is illegal under international law to use immigration deten-
tion to deter future asylum seekers or to dissuade those who
have commenced their claims from pursuing them (United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1999; see also Main-
waring 2012). It is less clear whether states can use it as a means
to coerce rejected asylum seekers and other deportable migrants
into a willingness to leave. Various nongovernmental organiza-
tions believe not, and have criticized the lengthy maximum dura-
tion of immigration detention as well as the prison-like conditions
under which immigration detention is carried out (see for exam-
ple Amnesty International 2009; Jesuit Refugee Service-Europe
2010). Social scientists, too, have pointed at the harmful effects of
immigration law more generally for the well-being and social
incorporation of those with weaker legal statuses (see Menjıvar
and Abrego 2012). We agree that immigration detention should,
in accordance with international and national laws, only be used
as a last resort in order to prevent the risk of absconding, and
should be carried out under conditions adjusted to the adminis-
trative nature of the detention.
In addition to the legal-normative question of what uses of
immigration detention are permissible and acceptable, there is also
the empirical-theoretical question of whether and how immigra-
tion detention affects migration preferences, and, if so, whether its
influences are a result of deterrence, or whether other mecha-
nisms, such as the perceived (il)legitimacy of the detention, (also)
play a role. The central question of this contribution is: How, and
to what extent, does immigration detention—under conditions
found in the Netherlands in 2011—affect the willingness of detain-
ees to leave the territory of the detaining state, and are eventual
changes in detainees’ migration preferences produced by deter-
rence? The analysis is based on unique data that was initially gath-
ered in cooperation with the International Organization of
Migration (IOM) (Kox 2011). Semistructured face-to-face inter-
views were conducted with 81 immigrants who were being held in
pre-expulsion detention in 2011, and information was obtained
about the administrative outcome of their detention. In this article,
we analyze detainees’ attitudes as they were expressed during
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detention. Elsewhere, we analyzed the relationship between
detainee attitudes and detention outcomes (Leerkes and Kox
2016), but some results are also reported here. Post-deportation
attitudinal changes lie outside the scope of the study. The data
were fully reanalyzed after the cooperation with IOM had ended.
It is conceivable that immigration detention indeed causes
forms of deterrence that, in some ways, resemble what would be
called “specific deterrence” in the context of criminal imprison-
ment.1 Here, the wish to prevent additional detention—either
continued or repeated detention—possibly produces “law-abiding
behavior” among those who have actually been detained. Three
varieties of such deterrence potentially exist. First, detainees may
be pressured into cooperating with the deportation procedure by
giving up their claims to legal status or by disclosing their nation-
ality and/or identity. The detaining state has an interest in identi-
fying and documenting (undocumented) detainees, as no country
of origin accepts undocumented returnees (Broeders 2007;
Ellermann 2008). Second, those who are released because of a
failed deportation procedure may try to leave the country on
their own so as to prevent repeated detention. Third, deportees
may refrain from re-immigrating in order to prevent repeated
detention. This study focuses on the first and second variety of
specific deterrence, so understood.
There is only fragmentary and contradictory evidence about
whether and how immigration detention impacts detainees’
migration preferences and behavior. To our knowledge, the pre-
sent study is unique in addressing these questions on the basis of
a substantial number of interviews conducted in detention cen-
ters. Hasselberg (2014: 481) conducted ethnographic research
among 18 foreign-national offenders who were facing deporta-
tion from the United Kingdom, but had been granted bail from
immigration detention. Most respondents indeed perceived the
detention as being designed to pressure them into leaving, and
some of them—especially those who had been detained repeat-
edly—felt that the detention “‘break[s] one down’ to the point of
agreeing to deportation.” Kalhan (2010), too, mentions in passing
that for the United States, there is a deterrent effect in the sense
that detainees may give up their claims to legal status and comply
with deportation in order to end the detention. Mainwaring
(2012), however, argues that economic hardship and political
1 Immigration detention may also produce what would be called “general deterrence”
in case of criminal imprisonment. Here, the fear of detention possibly controls the behavior
of migrants who have not actually experienced the detention center, but who risk being
detained. For example, rejected asylum seekers may decide to leave the state’s territory
“voluntarily,” because they wish to evade pre-expulsion detention.
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persecution give African migrants little choice but to continue
their migration project regardless of the risk of being detained in
Malta for 18 months. Unfortunately, her analysis potentially suf-
fers from selection regarding the dependent variable, as only
unauthorized migrants were interviewed outside of detention,
thereby possibly excluding individuals from the sample who were
deterred by detention and no longer stayed on Malta. Van
Kalmthout (2004) conducted extensive fieldwork in two Dutch
detention centers, but the authors did not specifically investigate
the eventual impact of detention on migration preferences. They
do report that most respondents did not want to go to their
country of citizenship in the short term, and that their preferen-
ces did not seem to change much.
The analysis focuses on deterrence, but we also pay ample
attention to how migrants perceive the legitimacy of immigration
detention. There are different conceptualizations of legitimacy (see
Fallon 2005). As a legal concept, legitimacy refers to lawfulness
and internal consistency of the law, such as a law being in accor-
dance with the constitution. As a philosophical concept, legitimacy
means that a law or institution is believed to be right and justifi-
able in the light of some philosophical principle, such as the princi-
ple of sovereignty. Here, we follow a sociological conceptualization
of legal legitimacy, which pertains to the normative acceptance of
the law in society, especially among those who are targeted by the
law. A practice can be in accordance with the law, while not being
perceived as legitimate by the ruled. Criminal justice research has
shown that perceived legitimacy of the law is crucial for compli-
ance. Usually, normative models of compliance are even found to
have more explanatory power than economic (“rational choice”)
models of compliance such as found in deterrence theory (see for
example Tyler 2003; Tyler et al. 2010), and this also seems to hold
for migration decisions that are reached outside of detention (Ryo
2013). There also is the possibility that deterrence and perceived
(il)legitimacy interact in complex ways. Defiance theory, for exam-
ple, argues that deterrent effects require that the targets of a sanc-
tion perceive the sanction as legitimate (Sherman 1993). While we
contend that this claim is too strong, it seems probable that deter-
rent effects become more likely when the detainee attributes some
measure of legitimacy to the detention. Paying attention to per-
ceived (il)legitimacy also is a way to do justice to, and provide
more information about, the contested nature of immigration
detention, or what Bosworth (2011, 2014) calls its “legitimacy defi-
cit,” thereby strengthening the detainee perspective in this debate.
In what follows, it is shown that immigration detention,
though generally perceived as rather painful and distressing, pro-
duced limited specific deterrent effects at the attitudinal level,
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which were concentrated among respondents classified as labor
migrants and, relatedly, among respondents who attributed some
measure of legitimacy to their detention. It is argued that most
migrants had interests that outweighed their interest in the
detention being ended, and that the detention also triggered
mechanisms—including resistance on normative grounds—that
actually reinforced detainees’ preferences to stay in the country
of the detaining state.
The next section provides some contextual information on
the Dutch case. Subsequently, we elaborate the theoretical frame-
work, describe how the fieldwork was carried out, and report our
results. In the concluding section, we discuss the broader scien-
tific implications of this contribution for the study of international
migration and the study of legal compliance.
The Dutch Immigration Detention Regime
As there are international differences in how immigration
detention is organized (see Wilsher 2012), it is useful to provide
some contextual information on the Dutch case in 2011. Accord-
ing to the EU Return Directive, immigration detention may last
for six months, unless the detainee is considered uncooperative
in revealing his/her identity and/or has been convicted of certain
crimes, in which case the detention may be extended to 18
months. Within this limit, there is considerable international vari-
ation in Europe. The Netherlands is in a cluster of countries also
including Germany, Denmark, and Italy, where the maximum
detention duration is 18 months. These countries in particular,
seem to use the detention for deterrence purposes given the long
maximum detention duration. In that respect, they resemble the
United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom (which opted
out of the EU Return Directive), which do not have a pre-set
maximum detention duration and sometimes use it for years in a
row. Other EU countries, such as France (45 days) and Belgium
(five months), have considerably shorter maximum detention
durations, or use the detention for relatively short periods (in
2008, the average detention duration in Sweden was 20.8 days).2
In the Netherlands, about half of those detained in 2011 spent
more than three months in detention, while a quarter were
detained for six months or more. On average, pre-expulsion
detention lasted 74 days (Van Schijndel and Van Gemmert 2012).
In 2011, the total inflow in Dutch immigration detention
2 Figures on detention duration were taken from http://www.globaldetentionproject.
org (country profiles) (accessed June 2015).
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amounted to 6,104 persons, and 5,844 persons entered pre-
expulsion detention (Van Schijndel and Van Gemmert 2012).
Noncitizens can be detained under Dutch law if various con-
ditions are met. These include the foreigner lacking a right to
stay in the country (or being likely to lose that right) and there
being a realistic probability of deportation. If there is insufficient
view to deportation, or if the government has made insufficient
progress toward deporting the individual, the detention has to be
terminated. Released detainees are usually given a day train
ticket and an order to leave the country. Those who stay can be
re-detained, provided that there is a “new fact” that supposedly
increases the probability of deportation, such as new information
about the individual’s identity, or when at least a year has passed
since the previous detention period. Immigration judges may
decide that a detention is unlawful, and immigration attorneys
have significant influence over such decisions (see Ryo 2016), but
such institutional safeguards have not prevented significant levels
of repeated immigration detention. In 2010, 45 percent of the
detainees were released because of a failed expulsion procedure,
and 27 percent had been in Dutch immigration detention previ-
ously (Kox 2011). In the case of repeated detention, the cumula-
tive detention duration may exceed 18 months.
At the time of writing, a governmental proposal to develop a
specific detention regime for immigration detainees is being dis-
cussed in parliament,3 but in 2011, the pre-expulsion detention
regime was modeled after the regime for crime suspects who are
detained before their trials. Detainees were to stay in their cells—
mostly designed to hold two people—between 5 pm and 8 am,
and between 12 noon and 1 pm. When out of their cells, they
were to spend time in a common recreation room with cooking
facilities, television, table tennis, and parlor games. A program of
18 hours a week was on offer, including airing (one hour per
day), sports (45 minutes twice a week), recreational activities (six
hours a week), library visits (one hour per week), religious cere-
monies (one hour per week), and visits (two hours per week).
There were no “re-integration facilities” such as labor, educa-
tional programs, or training courses.
In the Netherlands, some detainees are given the option of
leaving the country via “Assisted Voluntary Return from
Detention” (AVRD), instead of being deported. In case of AVRD,
detainees are released at the airport where they meet an IOM
employee in the departure hall. This happens under a number
of conditions, which includes the “removal” not being delayed.
3 Parliamentary Documents 2015/16, 34 309, no.1–9.
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An additional specificity of the European context is that
released detainees have the option of (illegal) onward migration:
migrating to other European countries is illegal, but not too diffi-
cult, since land borders are normally rarely policed within the
Schengen Area, an area comprising 26 European states that have
abolished all passport controls at their mutual borders. The Area
includes the Netherlands and the two countries where it has land
borders with (Germany and Belgium).4 In the past, rejected asy-
lum seekers and (other) unauthorized migrants could obtain legal
stay in a different European country, if only temporarily—i.e., dur-
ing the asylum procedure—by submitting an asylum request there.
However, under the Dublin III Regulation (EC 604/2013), a suc-
cessor of the Dublin Convention that became in force in 1997,
those reapplying for asylum in a different European country, or
who apply for asylum while they could have done so sooner in a
different European country, may be rejected without further con-
sideration and be returned to the “responsible state” for examin-
ing the asylum claim, usually the state through which the migrant
first entered the EU (see Thielemann and Armstrong 2013).
Compared to the United States, where an estimated 52 percent
of all unauthorized immigrants in 2014 were Mexicans (Passel and
Cohn 2016), the unauthorized population in the Netherlands is
quite heterogeneous in terms of national origin. In 2011, more
than 60 percent of the detainees were from countries that, on their
own, represented less than 5 percent of the detainees (Van Schijn-
del and Van Gemmert 2012). The most prevalent nationality was
Iraqi with 9.6 percent. It has been estimated that women repre-
sented almost one third (29 percent) of the unauthorized popula-
tion in 2012 (Van der Heijden et al. 2015). Since women run
significantly lower risks of apprehension than men (Leerkes et al.
2012), they only represented 13 percent of all immigration detain-
ees in 2011 (Van Schijndel and Van Gemmert 2012).
Conditional Deterrence?
Immigration detention in the Netherlands has three main
direct “migration outcomes”: (1) deportation or AVRD to a coun-
try where the detainee’s admission is guaranteed, usually the
detainee’s country of citizenship, (2) a continued unauthorized
stay in territory of the detaining state, and (3) illegal onward
4 It is allowed for Member States to conduct migration policing in border zones, away
from the actual geographical border. Police may, under conditions, stop vehicles or check
international trains for unauthorized migrants when there is a “reasonable presumption of
illegal residence.” After 2014, the border controls were–temporarily–increased in response
to the elevated influx of asylum seekers in the EU.
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migration to another European country.5 Before being detained,
each detainee will generally prefer continued stay in the territory
of the detaining state, although this does not hold for all detain-
ees.6 “Specific deterrence” at the attitudinal level can be said to
have occurred when a preference for continued stay has changed
into (1) a preference to return to the country of citizenship or (2)
onward migration to a different European country—and that the
change is due to the detention being experienced as frightening
or discouraging.
Potentially, two aspects of the immigration detention experi-
ence could produce such attitudinal deterrent effects. The first
involves the perceived severity of the immigration detention experi-
ence. Much like criminal prisoners, immigration detainees are
subjected to various forms of deprivation, or what Sykes (1958)
famously called the “pains of imprisonment.” A reduction of
autonomy and a loss of liberty are inherent in detention and
most detainees experience a reduced access to social relationships
as visitors face travel costs and visiting hours, internet access and
opportunities to make phone calls are limited, and potential visi-
tors who are unauthorized themselves are unlikely to visit the
centers. Additionally, detainees experience material deprivation,
especially those who were ordinarily employed. Detainees typi-
cally share a cell with a stranger and cannot work but receive
some pocket money to buy some goods in the detention shop.
Deprivation of security may also be relevant, as, in Sykes’s words,
each immigration detainee is “thrown into prolonged intimacy”
with other detainees. This can provoke anxiety, especially when
other detainees have a criminal background and/or are mentally
instable. Crewe (2011) recently argued that Sykes’s pains of
imprisonment, though still relevant today, represent only a part
of the painfulness of imprisonment as detainees may also be
subjected to what he calls the “pains of uncertainty and
indeterminacy.” This certainly also holds for immigration detain-
ees as they do not know in advance how long they will be
detained (within the maximally allowed detention duration),
while it is often unclear whether they will be deported (see
Becket and Evans 2015).
The second aspect involves the perceived risk of repeated
immigration detention. Being detained implies that one has been
“caught,” and that one’s unauthorized status is known to the
authorities. People who have experienced a sanction tend to
5 Other outcomes include legalization or a temporary deportation ban.
6 For example, some individuals are apprehended en route to a different country or
while in the process of preparing their return or onward migration. Others prefer to return
to their country of citizenship before being apprehended, but lack the papers to do so.
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perceive the probability of similar sanctions in the future as
higher than before the sanction was imposed (Matsueda et al.
2006; Piquero and Pogarsky 2002), and this may also hold for
the sanction of immigration detention. Perceived probability of a
sanction, in turn, tends to increase rule compliance (see, for
example, Tyler 2003). In other words, we may find detainees rea-
soning that it is in their interest to leave the territory of the
detaining state because, having been apprehended and detained,
they believe that repeated detention is likely should the deporta-
tion procedure fail.
For two reasons, detention may be perceived as painful and
repeated detention as probable, without continued stay becoming
the least preferred detention outcome. First—taking the rational
choice perspective that is implied in deterrence theory—there
may be a kind of threshold effect before actual deterrence occurs
(see Tyler 2003). After all, the “utility” of staying in the country
of the detaining state, though lowered by the “costs” of the
detention experience, may still be higher than the “utility” of
being sent to one’s country of citizenship or, should the deporta-
tion procedure fail, of going to a third country. Similarly, it is
conceivable that detainees experience the detention as painful,
while they do not see it as a major deterioration of their situation,
such as when the person concerned normally leads a strongly
marginalized existence in the territory of the detaining state
when out of detention.
Second, the deterrent effects may be offset by resistance
should the detention be perceived as illegitimate. Normative
models of rule compliance maintain that rules are followed
because people believe that doing so is right or, as the neo-
institutionalists emphasize (Scott 2008), as “normal,” that is, “as
the way we do these things.” A distinction is usually made
between the normative evaluation of outcomes and procedures
(Tyler 2003). Outcome legitimacy means that the law’s content is
considered fair; procedural legitimacy means that rules are
enforced in ways that are perceived as just, by actors who are
trusted. The first type of legitimacy encompasses a judgement
about the acceptability of the official objective of (pre-expulsion)
immigration detention, namely that the detainee leaves the terri-
tory over which the detaining state claims territorial sovereignty,
usually by “returning” to his or her country of citizenship. The
second type of legitimacy encompasses a normative judgement
about the acceptability of how and by whom that outcome is real-
ized. This both entails a judgement about the use of immigration
detention in cases like the detainee’s, and a judgement about
how the detention is organized in terms of detention duration,
the possibility of repeated detention, available programs,
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interactional styles of the guards, and so forth. Migrants who per-
ceive their deportation and/or their deportation procedure as ille-
gitimate can be expected to try to obstruct the deportation
procedure.
Defiance theory has aimed to synthesize deterrence theory
with legitimacy theories (Sherman 1993). It argues that the deter-
rent effects of a sanction require that those subjected to the sanc-
tion perceive it as legitimate. While this claim seems too strong—
we can conceive deterrent effects in the absence of perceived
legitimacy—it does suggest the possibility of a kind of “interaction
effect” in the sense that people may be most likely to comply
when the product of perceived severity, perceived certainty and
perceived legitimacy reaches a kind of optimum. In this view,
increases in perceived severity are likely to eventually undermine
compliance by reducing perceived (process) legitimacy.
Data and Method
The data were initially collected as part of a research project
for IOM Netherlands, which wanted to learn more about how
detainees experienced the detention, and how they assessed
IOM’s presence in the centers in the context of AVRD. The pro-
ject was directed by the second author who was hired for the pro-
ject by IOM; the Sociology department of Erasmus University
Rotterdam—under guidance of the first author—provided advice
and assisted with the fieldwork and analysis.
Semistructured interviews with 81 immigration detainees
were conducted in May, June, and July 2011 in the three main
detention centers that were operational in the Netherlands at the
time (Rotterdam, Zaandam, and Zeist). All respondents were ran-
domly selected from the resident lists. IOM employees working
in the detention centers tried to approach 232 detainees; of
these, 144 persons could not be interviewed: (1) 62 persons were
not in the centers because of departure, release, or appointments
at courts or embassies, (2) 51 persons were unwilling to be inter-
viewed, or anticipated that it would be too emotionally demand-
ing, and (3) 30 candidates faced communication issues. Apart
from the 81 interviews, seven interviews were terminated prema-
turely due to unexpected language barriers or because these
interviewees found the interview too emotionally demanding;
these were excluded from the analysis. The interviews took place
in the detention centers’ consulting rooms and lasted between 45
minutes and 3 hours.
The interviews were conducted by the authors, by IOM
employees who specialize in client contacts in the clients’ mother
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tongue, and by a university research assistant.7 All interviewers
received interview training. While some respondents criticized
the IOM, most did not feel that IOM put pressure on them to
leave the Netherlands, and we have the impression that
respondents felt comfortable telling their stories, also given the
detailed information they provided, including during the inter-
views with the IOM employees. The interviewers recorded the
interview or took notes, depending on the possibilities for
recording and the preferences of interviewee and interviewer.
All interviews were held in the respondent’s first or second lan-
guage, with ten different languages being used in total. A tele-
phonic interpreter assisted with five interviews. The
respondents’ case files held by IOM, the Dutch Immigration and
Naturalization Service (IND) and the Repatriation and Depar-
ture Service (DT&V) were also studied in order to gather proce-
dural information, including the respondents’ juridical position
and history, possible previous detainments, and the administra-
tive outcome of the detention in terms of deportation, AVRD, or
release in the Netherlands. Respondents were guaranteed ano-
nymity, but the Custodial Institutions Agency knew who partici-
pated, as respondents could only be interviewed by appointment
in a detention setting.
Respondents were interviewed about their situation in their
country of citizenship and the Netherlands, their stay in immigra-
tion detention, their thoughts on the future and their attitude
with regard to staying in or leaving the Netherlands, and the pos-
sible consequences of their stay(s) in immigration detention for
their migration preferences. We realized that the respondents
possibly perceived an interest in creating an impression that they
were “cooperating” with the removal procedure: detainees who
are seen as uncooperative by immigration judges risk an exten-
sion of the detention period. In order to minimize that risk, rela-
tively long and open interviews were designed, during which we
attempted to create “rapport.” For example, before sensitive
questions regarding “return” were asked, respondents were given
the opportunity to explain in their own words why and when
they had migrated, what their situation in the Netherlands had
looked like, and what they thought of immigration detention.
Additionally, respondents were not explicitly asked whether they
were “cooperating” with the Dutch authorities, but—using open
questions—were interviewed about eventual changes in their
7 We conducted 24 interviews. Seven IOM employees (who work as “native
counselors”) and the university research assistant conducted the remaining interviews.
Native counselors normally inform migrants about return, and originate from—and speak
the language native to—relevant source countries.
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migration preferences. For example, it was asked “Have your
return intentions changed during your stay in immigration
detention? How? Why/why not?” Two questions measured the
perceived legitimacy of the detention: (1) “Do you think the
Dutch government has a right to detain you? (Why/Why not?)”
and (2) “Do you think the detention conditions are appropriate
given the reason for your detention? (Why/Why not?).” Both
questions incited statements about perceived process legitimacy.
The first question in particular also provided information about
perceived outcome legitimacy.
After the project for IOM had ended, all interviews were rean-
alyzed. Both authors independently coded the respondents’ state-
ments, including their migration preferences at the time of the
interview and their (retrospectively reported) preferences before
the detention period. For repeatedly detained respondents, the
stated migration preference before the first detention period was
also coded. There was insufficient information to systemically clas-
sify the respondents on perceived outcome and process legitimacy
separately, but their statements did allow us to tentatively divide
the respondent into a “low” and a “higher” perceived legitimacy
group. The first group believed that the Dutch government had
no right to detain and deport them whatsoever and also believed
that the detention conditions were inappropriate in their case.
Most respondents in the second group were also quite critical
about at least some aspects of the detention, but either indicated
that the government had some kind of right to detain people in
cases such like theirs (be it for a shorter period, not repeatedly,
and so forth) and/or found the detention conditions appropriate.
If transcripts initially resulted in different codings, the final coding
was decided on after discussion among the authors.8
While analyzing the interviews, we inductively found indica-
tions that the effects of detention, and the reasons that respond-
ents had to try to resist deportation, depended on respondents’
migration projects. In order to examine such differences in a
more systematic way, we classified the respondents into family
migrants, asylum migrants, and labor migrants. This was done using
the information that respondents provided during the interviews
regarding their reasons for leaving their respective countries of
origin. Family migrants were defined as respondents who men-
tioned that a desire to reunify with family or a partner in The
Netherlands had been among the reasons for leaving their coun-
try of origin. Asylum migrants indicated that a desire to apply for
8 Conflicting interpretations could mostly be resolved by fine-tuning definitions of the
codings. In a few cases, the coding of the author who conducted the interview was followed.
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asylum had been among the reasons for emigrating. Respondents
who had come to Europe without reunifying with immediate
family members, and without the intention to apply for asylum,
were classified as labor migrants. Most of them had migrated to
Europe and (eventually) the Netherlands to work; a few had
come in hopes of being able to study in Europe or had left their
country of origin without a clear plan for the future. It could be
said that we followed a hierarchical classification. First, we deter-
mined whether the respondent left his or her country or origin
in order to reunify with family (yes: “family migrant”; no:
“asylum or labor migrant”); as a second step, we then determined
for each “asylum or labor migrant” whether he or she had left
the country or origin to apply for asylum (yes: “asylum migrant,”
no: “labor migrant”).
The classification of respondents into these three groups—it
may be better to speak of partially overlapping “clusters of
respondents”—served as a heuristic tool that helped us to under-
stand and describe the implications of what are meaningful dif-
ferences in respondents’ migration projects. It should be
emphasized that we do not mean to essentialize immigrant cate-
gories. Evidently, people may migrate for more than one reason
in complex “configurations of motives,” which may also change
during the migration project. Some respondents classified as asy-
lum and labor migrants eventually obtained a partner in the
Netherlands. A few respondents classified as labor migrants
applied for asylum at a later stage. Various respondents classified
as family or asylum migrants also mentioned economic reasons
for leaving their country of origin. While all asylum migrants in
our sample had migrated without reunifying with direct family
members, some had remote relatives in the Netherlands.
We repeatedly discussed ethical aspects among each other,
including the question of whether it is ethical to conduct research
on the (in)effectiveness of immigration detention given the possi-
bility that the results may be used in society to legitimize immi-
gration detention, including the—ethically and legally dubious—
use of lengthy immigration detention under prison-like condi-
tions. Unfortunately, there is little scientific debate on such nor-
mative aspects (see D€uvell et al. 2009), and we found that
scientific codes of ethics provide limited, perhaps insufficient,
guidance.9 We eventually concluded that it is justified and
9 The code of ethics of the International Sociological Association mentions that
researchers should be aware that results may be used for various non-scientific purposes,
and that they are entitled to intervene to correct possible misinterpretations, but is silent on
whether certain research questions should perhaps not be asked, or whether certain results
should perhaps not be reported in the light of concerns about certain extra-scientific uses.
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important to conduct social scientific research on this topic. We
consider the research not a priori harmful in democratic societies,
where different publics may or may not use research findings for
different purposes, including purposes that researchers do not
personally advocate. We hope that our findings contribute to a
richer scientific and public debate on the functions, human rights
performance, and (il)legitimacy of immigration detention.
Results: Pressured to Depart?
Quantitative Overview
The analysis focuses on how the respondents experienced the
detention. However, given the relatively large sample size and the
use of probability sampling, we decided to also present some
quantitative findings based on our codings, so as to make optimal
use of the data (see Namey et al. [2008] on the possibilities and
limitations of quantifying qualitative data). Before describing how
the respondents experienced the detention, we therefore start
with a description of the main characteristics of the research
group, followed by a quantitative overview of the reported migra-
tion preferences of the respondents.
Research Group
The respondents, 73 men and eight women, were from 36 dif-
ferent countries, mainly located in North and West Africa, South/
Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America (mostly Suri-
nam). Ages varied from 18 to 67 and averaged around 34. The
detention frequency varied from one to no fewer than eight times,
and 33 respondents had been detained previously. The average
duration of the most recent detention at the time of the interview
was 4.4 months, varying from a few days up to 15 months. Some
respondents had only been apprehended because of illegal stay in
the country, others also had police contacts due to suspicions
regarding felonies and/or minor misdemeanors. All but five
respondents were illegally residing in the Netherlands at the time
of the interview: four had a precarious form of legal stay as part of
a procedure to obtain a residence permit, and one risked losing
his residence permit because he had been sentenced for a crime.
Information by the Custodial Institutions Agency indicated that
the sample was quite representative with regard to sex, age, and
migration motive, with former asylum seekers making up about
half of the detainee population. Detainees with longer detention
durations were somewhat overrepresented, however, and some
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nationalities—including Somalian, Georgian, Algerian, Ghanaian,
and Eritrean—were underrepresented.
As was mentioned in the previous section, respondents were
classified into family migrants, asylum migrants, and labor
migrants based on their initial migration motive. The three
groups indeed differed on a number of characteristics that can be
expected to be correlated with migration motive, including coun-
try of origin, number of former residence permit holders, and
duration of stay in the Netherlands. The groups were quite simi-
lar in other respects, including age and sex composition, and
there were no notable differences with respect to their detention
duration.
The respondents classified as family migrants (N5 13) mostly
originated from countries that have been source countries of
immigration to the Netherlands for some time, like the former
colony Surinam, and the former “guest worker” country
Morocco, but others were from Tunisia, Pakistan, Egypt, and
Syria. Family ties do not preclude an unauthorized status as the
requirements for legal family migration include income and age
requirements, while certain family relations, such as those
between siblings or between parents and adult children, do not
normally give a right to a residence permit (Leerkes and Kulu-
Glasgow 2011). Most family migrants had immigrated without
state permission, but four used to have a residence permit, which
had been ended because of criminal offending. The duration of
stay of the family migrants varied from a number of months up
to 32 years, with an average of 14 years, making this the most
“established” group with the longest average duration of stay.
The longer duration of stay was also reflected in a somewhat
larger share of respondents who had been detained in immigra-
tion detention before.
The asylum migrants (N5 39) originated from 25 different
countries, mostly located in North or West Africa and Asia
(including the Middle East), and, less so, Eastern Europe. A sub-
stantial number were from countries that were experiencing mili-
tary conflicts at the time, or that had oppressive regimes,
including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Ethiopia, Russia, and
China. They had been in the country between 0 and 27 years,
with an average of six years. Some seemed to have weak asylum
claims; others had possibly encountered difficulties in proving a
well-founded fear of persecution or fled unsafe conditions that
are not recognized as grounds for asylum. States may also end
protection when conditions in countries of origin have improved
only to some extent (see Black and Gent 2006). Seven asylum
migrants were former residence permit holders. Contrary to the
family migrants, their permits had not been ended because of
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crimes, but because they were no longer deemed in need of
protection.
The labor migrants (N5 29) originated from 13 different coun-
tries, mostly located in Africa and Asia, including Morocco, Nige-
ria, Egypt, China, India, and Turkey. Three were from South
America, and one from Eastern Europe. In this group, the dura-
tion of stay in the Netherlands varied from some days up to 32
years, with an average of nine years. European countries have a
rather strict admission policy for labor migrants, especially when
it concerns “unskilled” labor. Residence permits are only granted
when the employer can prove that the work cannot be done by a
native worker or (other) EU citizen. Indeed, only two respond-
ents in this group had ever obtained a residence permit.
Migration Preferences
Figure 1 provides an overview of respondents’ migration
preferences at the time of the interview and—retrospectively
reported—just before the detention period during which the
respondents were interviewed. The figure pertains to all
respondents (N5 81), regardless of whether they had been
detained in immigration detention before. Figure 2 specifically
pertains to the 33 respondents who had been detained in immi-
gration detention repeatedly. It should be stressed that these fig-
ures are indicative, as they are based on our interpretation of the
respondents’ statements in a semistructured interview.
Just before the detention, 10 of 81 respondents preferred to
go to their country of citizenship; against 17 respondents (not












0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Undecided / unclear
Before this detenon At the me of the interview
Figure 1. Migration Preferences Before and During Detention (All
Respondents).
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The number of respondents expressing a preference for onward
migration similarly increased somewhat from 12 to 16. Eleven
respondents were still undecided, or were unable to make their
preferences clear. All in all, the number of respondents with a
preference for continued stay decreased from 53 to 37 (19 per-
cent of 81 respondents) during the detention. Among the 33
repeatedly detained respondents, migration preferences just
before the detention had sometimes been produced by previous
detention periods (see Figure 2). When these previous deten-
tions are also taken into account, the number of respondents
preferring return migration had increased by 16 ([17–10]1 [9–
0]516) during the detention, while the number of respondents
preferring onward migration had increased by seven ([16–
12]1 [5–2]57). These results suggest that immigration detention
pressures a notable minority into a preference to leave the
country.
All changes in migration preferences were reported to be
detention-related, but repeatedly detained respondents in partic-
ular, also attributed eventual changes to factors other than deten-
tion, or indicated that they were a more indirect result of
detention. For instance, some of them had changed their mind
because of difficulties they had encountered after previous deten-
tions, for example because they had lost their jobs because of the
detention.
Labor migrants seemed to be more likely than family and
asylum migrants to have changed their mind. Those classified as
labor migrants represented 35 percent of the sample, but 63 per-
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Figure 2. Migration Preferences Before and During Detention (Repeatedly
Detained Respondents).
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“return” (10 of 16), and 57 percent of the additional respondents
who preferred onward migration at the time of the interview (4
of 7). As expected, respondents in the higher legitimacy group
were relatively likely to report a preference to “return”: while
only 38 of the 81 respondents (44 percent) attributed at least
some measure of legitimacy to their detention, this percentage
was 82 percent (14 of 17) among those who, at the time of the
interview, preferred to go to their country of citizenship. This
was not the case for those expressing a preference for onward
migration; only 25 percent (4 of 16) of them were in the higher
legitimacy group.
Part of the overrepresentation of labor migrants among those
reporting a preference to go to their country of citizenship
seemed to be related to an association between perceived legiti-
macy and type of migration. Nineteen of 29 labor migrants (66
percent) were in the higher legitimacy group, against 13 of 39
asylum migrants (33 percent) and six of 13 family migrants (46
percent). These differences echo culturally dominant beliefs and
established regulations with regards to immigration rights—while
labor migration is generally not considered a right, most coun-
tries do recognize a conditional right to asylum and family migra-
tion (see Walzer 1983).
The gender composition of the research group reflected the
underrepresentation of women among immigration detainees.
Accordingly, the number of female respondents (N58) was too
small to make assertions about eventual gender differences.
When comparing men and women, we did observe more or less
similar patterns, suggesting that immigration detention produces
limited specific deterrent effects among men and women alike,
which are concentrated among labor migrants and those attribut-
ing some measure of legitimacy to the detention, irrespective of
gender. Three female respondents—all part of the labor migrant
and higher legitimacy group—developed a return preference
during the detention, five persisted in a preference to stay.
After the project for IOM had been completed, we asked the
Dutch government to provide us with information about the
administrative outcome of the respondents’ detention. We
learned that more than two-thirds of them (59 of 81, 69 percent)
had eventually been released in the Netherlands, including 10 of
the 17 respondents (59 percent) who had expressed a preference
to go to their country of citizenship.
In the next section, we describe how family migrants, asylum
migrants, and labor migrants experienced the detention, and
why immigration detention did or did not alter their migration
preferences. The interview fragments also show that there was a
notable degree of “blurring” between the three types of migrants,
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and that migration motives sometimes changed during an indi-
vidual’s migration project.
The Voice of the Detainee
Family Migrants
Most family migrants had a strong socio-cultural attachment
to the territory of the detaining state due to their family ties and
the length of their stay in the Netherlands. As a consequence,
they generally tried to resist deportation and were reluctant to
migrate to a different European country. They certainly did not
consider detention a trivial matter, however. A Surinamese man,
who had been reunified with his elderly mother as an adult, and
had lived in the country without state permission for 13 years,
was a case in point. Having been detained twice before—the last
time had been for nine months—he found the detention quite
stressful, yet he insisted on staying in the Netherlands.
“This is no life. I mean for illegal Dutchmen in general. It’s
not good for honest people. If you keep somebody here for
nine months, you’ve stolen a year of his life . . . Last time I
slept with four people in a cell [for nine months]. . . . My
health is still fine but I am a bit stressed about what’s going
to happen. I talk in my sleep and I’ve been to a
psychologist.”
Like most respondents, the man primarily complained about
the loss of freedom, the perceived unfairness of the detention,
the uncertainly about the detention outcome, and his lack of per-
spective more generally. Additionally, he seemed to suffer from a
loss of status that comes with cell-sharing. Several other respond-
ents similarly experienced status deprivation, but focused more
on material aspects, or at least articulated their concerns in these
terms. A Moroccan man, for instance, lamented the quality of the
food:
“It’s distasteful. We only get bread and milk, one liter of milk
for four days, half a loaf of bread for two days, 100 grams of
sugar for four days. I try to make my own food, but the
[detention] shop asks one euro per tomato! Outside that buys
you a kilo!”
Despite experiencing deprivation, family migrants were gen-
erally reluctant to comply with arrangements for departure.
Their local family ties, and the associated ambition to settle in
the Netherlands permanently, was not easily offset by the “pains
of immigration detention,” not even repeated and prolonged
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detention. Additionally, family migrants were quite critical about
both the outcome and process legitimacy of the detention. A dif-
ferent Surinamese man, who had spent 3.5 months in his second
detention, was another case in point. Beginning in the late
1960s, his whole family had gradually migrated to the Nether-
lands: first his eldest sister, then all of his remaining siblings and
mother. When his marriage ended in 2001, he was the last family
member to emigrate, after which he remarried and became a
father:
“My wife and child are here. I want my child to make that
decision when she’s old enough, to decide herself where to
live and be. My home is here because I’ve been living here
for so long. The Netherlands is not the land of milk and
honey, and it isn’t easy [being unauthorized], but I’m in my
fifties and I don’t want to give up my life here. (. . .) You may
protect your borders and you don’t have to allow everybody,
but the sanction needs to make sense and they need to listen
to each story and pick the rotten apples. I have a permanent
address with my wife and child but I cannot officially register
there [being unauthorized]. And now they say that I am at
risk of absconding. I will not let myself be deported!”
Many family migrants also saw no viable alternatives but to
stay in the Netherlands since they did not have any relatives,
friends, or economic opportunities in their country of origin or
third countries. The aforementioned Moroccan, for example, had
lost one of his hands while working illegally for a butcher, without
being entitled to disability insurance as an unauthorized immi-
grant. With the exception of his elderly mother, all of his family
members lived in Europe, and even though he no longer had
close contact with his family—which he attributed to his accident—
he argued that he could not return to Morocco as a beggar:
“Here, I at least get some support from friends and a Moroc-
can foundation.”
As expected under deterrence theory, eventual changes in
migration preferences sometimes also seemed to be related to
increases in the perceived certainty of (repeated) immigration
detention. A young man wanted to return to Surinam, since his
sisters reasoned that he was likely to be re-caught—and perhaps
become a burden to them—now that he had been apprehended
for unauthorized residence:
“Well, look. When the detention wasn’t there, it went well.
But not anymore. Once they have you they will catch you
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again just like that. And I’ve made some money and stuff,
and now I want to return. I can work with my brother-in-law
[until I have arranged my papers for the Netherlands]. So
my sisters told me to go back to Surinam.”
In some instances, detention actually seemed to reinforce pref-
erences to stay in the territory of the detaining state. Group-wise
detention sometimes seemed to enable migrants to exchange
techniques to resist deportation:
“We talk a lot about how they can’t really force us to return.
And we advise each other regarding how it will be held
against you in court if you do not sufficiently [give the
impression that you] cooperate.”
Additionally, information on opportunities to deal with the
challenges of being unauthorized is sometimes also shared:
“I can’t work [being an unauthorized immigrant in the Neth-
erlands], I can only deal drugs. A guy offered me to make
some money [when I am outside] by receiving packages of
drugs every other week. But I‘m not into that kind of
thing.”10
Asylum Migrants
Most asylum migrants similarly considered the detention
quite severe, and were aware of the possibility of repeated deten-
tion even though this group was to a lesser extent repeatedly
detained in comparison with the other two groups. Even more so
than family migrants, most of them nonetheless tried to resist
deportation. In their case, this was not primarily because of a
strong socio-cultural attachment to the Netherlands, but rather
because they “feared return.” An Iranian woman, who claimed to
have fled an abusive husband, explained why being deprived of
liberty had not changed her mind:
“I am enclosed by four walls and it feels like I’m in prison.
Outside you’re free, you can call, go shopping. I’ve been here
for four months. . .. The people here do their best but it’s
very difficult. . .. . . Perhaps when you look at it from a higher
level, that you can understand the system. But I don’t see it
for myself. I came for safety, received these rejections, and
10 The respondent’s claim that he can “only deal drugs” is an overstatement, but it is
true that unauthorized migrants in the Netherlands have increasingly become dependent
on the informal and illegal economy (Leerkes et al. 2012).
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now I am locked up. It’s not fair when somebody comes for
safety. . .. I have children, and I want nothing more than to
be with them. But I cannot return home due to the problems
with my husband. . . I face a death threat when I return. . .”
Additionally, asylum migrants were even more critical about
the legitimacy of the detention than family migrants. This is, for
example, what a rejected Afghan asylum seeker said when an
interviewer inquired how he perceived the legitimacy of the
detention:
“What do you think yourself? I feel just like you if you would
sit here. Every day hundreds of people die in Afghanistan.
There is injustice. Troops go there, but it only makes things
worse. That’s why I was forced to come here, and then I get
locked up. If someone here [a European] dies because of the
war in Afghanistan they organize a march and mourn for ten
days; there, hundreds of people die each day and nothing is
done. There are no humane people here.”
Some respondents indicated, perhaps paradoxically, that a
residence permit would make it easier to leave, as it would enable
them to re-migrate should conditions be or become as unsafe as
they feared. A Liberian respondent complained about the bore-
dom of detention, the difficulty of communicating with the out-
side world, and his stress and associated medical problems
including migraines, stomach aches, and depression. Yet this is
what he said after almost a year of detention:
“I can’t go back. This is only possible if I have a residence
permit so I can come back if there are problems there. It’s
not safe right now because of the political situation and crime.
I know that from the internet, friends, and CNN.”
Asylum migrants tended to emphasize asylum-related
obstacles to returning, and to some extent this may have been a
way for them to justify and articulate their right to stay in
Europe. Apart from safety issues, however, some of them also
faced socioeconomic obstacles. Most of them had migrated to set-
tle in Europe permanently, or for an indefinite period of time,
and seemed to have left little to “return” to. One of our inter-
viewers reported the following about a West African man, aged
30, who had been in Europe for 12 years:
“He said his parents died in atrocious conditions, that he was
imprisoned, and saved by accident. . . . It’s his second deten-
tion. He says that all days are the same, that there’s nothing
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to do but to ‘sit, sit, sit’, and that he’s only ‘half a man’. His
health has worsened, he eats badly. He doesn’t consider
return, because he feels that he’s entitled to a residence per-
mit, and because his parents have died and his house was
destroyed. He also says he is not a criminal and doesn’t
understand why he can’t stay at a regular address.”
All detainees found immigration detention a painful experi-
ence, but a few valued at least some aspects of it. For example,
one respondent, who had initially come to Europe to seek asy-
lum, had been in the country for 27 years and was detained for
the sixth time.
“I cannot return. I don’t want to. My life’s here. I’m
detained, but it doesn’t matter to me. Look, you’re not free,
but it’s not bad.”
This relatively positive evaluation of detention was probably
related to the respondent’s frame of reference. He had become
addicted to drugs, had been living on the streets, and was regu-
larly ill. Other strongly marginalized detainees were similarly
negative about the loss of liberty and autonomy, but also valued
certain aspects of the detention to some extent, such as the medi-
cal care facilities (also see Leerkes 2016).
Compared to family migrants, asylum migrants were more
likely to consider onward migration to another EU country or, in
some cases, to Canada or the United States. Thus, despite the
aforementioned Dublin Regulation, substituting a different Euro-
pean country for the Netherlands still turned out to be a way to
continue migration projects, albeit irregularly. In fact, some
respondents had actually lived elsewhere in Europe after their asy-
lum claim had been rejected, or after previous deportation proce-
dures had failed. Others still intended to go elsewhere in Europe
should they be released. An Iraqi, for example, had gone to Bel-
gium in hopes of obtaining a residence permit there. His statements
show how a perceived severity of the detention without at least
some measure of perceived legitimacy of the detention may pres-
sure migrants into (illegal) onward migration rather than “return.”
“It’s not good. I have to go to Belgium again. There it’s bet-
ter. Here they keep you seven, eight, ten, 18 months. . . In
Belgium it’s two, three, four, and you’re free. And I can get a
residence permit there [this is actually unlikely]. Interviewer:
What specifically is so bad about this detention? Respondent:
Well, you’re imprisoned. You don’t know when you’ll get out,
you don’t sleep or eat well, with others in a cell, showering
together, just dirty. I don’t get it! I don’t come for money or
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something, I come for safety. I never had any problems with
the police, and in Europe they lock me up.”
Those among our respondents who had actually been
“displaced” to a different European country had all been appre-
hended there, and had been transferred to the Dutch authorities
to be re-detained. After having experienced that the Dublin regu-
lation ties asylum seekers to the (first) detaining state, some asy-
lum migrants no longer preferred onward migration.
A few asylum migrants wanted to go to their country of citi-
zenship. This mostly occurred after several detentions in combi-
nation with other difficulties of being unauthorized. Such
respondents also seemed to have weaker asylum claims—at least
they expressed milder fears concerning return. Some of them
were in the lower legitimacy group, suggesting that a perceived
legitimacy of immigration detention is not, as Sherman’s (1993)
defiance theory would have it, a necessary requirement for a
return preference to develop; some detainees were simply “tired”
after repeated detention. A Turkish Kurd had lived in a foster
home in Greece until the age of 14, when he migrated irregularly
to Italy, where the police allegedly denied him the opportunity to
apply for asylum. As there was little work, he went to France,
Belgium, and, eventually, the Netherlands, where he applied for
asylum claiming to be from Iraq because he had been told that
would increase his chances of obtaining asylum.
“I’ve seen nothing outside [since arriving in Europe]. Just
prison. The first time they caught me at the border and kept
me for six months. They released me, I went to Norway, got
sent back to the Netherlands, was locked up for 11 months.
Then I went to Belgium, got sent back, was detained a year.
And now it’s 6 months already! I’m so angry. Every day some-
body comes to talk. First a lawyer, then a woman, then a man,
now you. The people [guards] are nice, but I’m kept for noth-
ing, just for papers. They have no right to detain me. I came
for asylum and I have done nothing wrong. But I’m really
tired. I’ve never seen Iraq but I really want to go to Turkey. I
can work there. I watch Turkish TV every day [Turkey was
indeed experiencing an economic boom]. But I’m not regis-
tered there, and they keep trying to send me to Iraq.”
Labor Migrants
Deterrent effects at the attitudinal level were stronger among
labor migrants than among family and asylum migrants, but the
former did not perceive immigration detention as more severe,
nor did they perceive repeated detention as more probable.
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Rather, the differential impact of the detention experience on
respondents’ migration preferences seemed to be related to both
the differential migration projects among the three groups and
to different perceptions of the legitimacy of the detention. While
most family and asylum migrants had a strong orientation
towards a permanent stay, most labor migrants either intended to
go to their country of citizenship after having earned a certain
amount of money, or lacked a clear plan about how long they
would be away but still intended to “return” eventually. Still
others intended to establish themselves in Europe permanently,
but were open to work in a different European country. In fact, a
significant number of labor migrants had lived elsewhere in
Europe. As was mentioned in the quantitative overview, labor
migrants were also notably less negative about the legitimacy of
immigration detention.
A Nigerian man, who had migrated to work and “because
he had always dreamt about living in Amsterdam,” represented
a case where latent return intentions became more manifest
under the influence of detention. He came with the intention
of being away for seven years, but had been apprehended after
three. In the meantime, he had been doing relatively well shar-
ing a room with a friend and saving money by way of informal
jobs via an Amsterdam church. He would not mind continuing
that life in Amsterdam were he to be released, but after nine
months of detention he was prepared to go to Nigeria; he
feared “going crazy” in detention where he was regularly hav-
ing “weird dreams.” Like others who developed a return pref-
erence, he accounted for these changes in terms of deterrence,
that is, in terms of perceived severity and risk. However, he
also indicated that the government did have the right to detain
him, although no more than a month, suggesting that the
influence of legitimacy may largely operate on a more subcon-
scious level.
In some cases, pre-existing plans to eventually return to one’s
country of citizenship were brought forward because of a more
encompassing and gradual process of deterrence in which
repeated detention was one element. A Moroccan man from a
middle-class family had immigrated in the 1990s. After being
homeless for some time, he had found informal work in horticul-
ture, as well as housing that he shared with other unauthorized
immigrants. It had become increasingly difficult for him to work
in the greenhouses because of checks by the labor inspectorate.
The Dutch policy of discouraging unauthorized residence—which
was mainly developed in the 1990s and early 2000s—then
seemed to have initiated a process of marginalization and
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criminalization, which eventually contributed to a still unfulfilled
desire to go to Morocco:
“When I could no longer work in greenhouses, I started
doing irregular jobs for acquaintances, like painting, carpentry
work. But I didn’t earn enough. I also became addicted to
cocaine, and committed petty crimes. These were added up in
court, and I got 33 months of imprisonment, and was declared
an undesirable alien [continued residence as an undesired alien
is punishable as a crime against the state]. When I was detained
for so long and so frequently, I wanted to return. Since then
I’ve been presented to the embassy six times. They know my
nationality and identity but cannot do anything [he indicated
that the Moroccan authorities do not want to take him back
because of his record of offenses]. One time I tried to go back
myself, but got arrested in Belgium [on my way to Morocco].”
The man was classified into the higher legitimacy group, yet
was quite critical about repeated detention, a practice that clearly
shows the informal “incapacitation” function of immigration
detention (see Leerkes and Broeders 2010):
“I think that people [like me] should be detained until they
can be expelled. And if that doesn’t work out, they should
find a different solution. People should be able to go them-
selves or stay here. I can’t be deported. They know it, too,
and yet they detain me again.”
For geographical reasons, many undocumented labor
migrants initially migrate to Mediterranean EU countries, but a
notable number eventually travel to Western Europe. For a num-
ber of such respondents, the perceived severity of immigration
detention contributed to a desire to go back to their initial desti-
nation countries. A Palestinian stated:
“As a teenager I went to Libya. My parents had died, so
nothing kept me in Gaza. I worked in Libya for ten years
before going to Italy, both for work and the experience. After
three years I could no longer find work when three friends
went here. So I decided to also take the train up North. I
got arrested after spending 1.5 weeks here. The detention
conditions are okay, but it’s terrible to be locked up. When
I’m free again, I want to go back to Italy. The Netherlands is
a beautiful country but the law is horrible. . ..”
A few respondents developed a preference to leave, but
hoped that they would be away only temporarily. A Moroccan
man, who had worked in various informal jobs and had eventu-
ally entered into a relationship with a Dutch girl of Moroccan
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origin, thereby also illustrating how labor migrants may resemble
family migrants over time. He found it difficult to be deprived of
his liberty and income, and therefore preferred to go to Morocco
to arrange his immigration documents there. Should that be
impossible, he hoped to go from Morocco to Spain, and reunite
with his girlfriend there.11 He intended to go to Spain directly
should the deportation procedure fail. Several of his friends had
gone there after having being detained in the Netherlands, and
claimed that Spain was preferable. He explained:
“I had work and we [my girlfriend and I] went to the beach
each week. I was happy. But here we are in our cells from 5
pm to 8:15 am. That’s almost 15 hours! It drives me crazy:
I’ve done nothing, why am I here? And I don’t get enough
food and need to do my own shopping on [an allowance of]
10 euro per week, but that’s not enough.”
Like most family and asylum migrants, several labor migrants
nonetheless persisted in a preference to stay, even when con-
fronted with prolonged and/or repeated detention. They usually
mentioned that they were afraid to leave “empty handed”: they
could not return without bringing a sufficient amount of savings
from their earnings. In these cases, detention sometimes seemed
to extend rather than shorten migration projects. For example, a
Chinese man, who was in his third immigration detention period
in eight years, had initially planned to stay in Europe for a few
years only. Although his detention experiences had made him
believe that “the Dutch government is really determined to arrest
me”—thereby appearing to confirm theoretical assumptions about
the effect of being caught on the perceived probability of being re-
caught—this was insufficient for him to consider returning.
“Every time I’d saved some money, they put me in detention.
Every time my life’s on track, I get arrested. I’ve lost every-
thing I had. My planning was not to stay, but now I have to.”
A Cameroonian man, who had stopped contacting his family
when he found himself unable to send remittances, similarly
explained:
“You’re keeping me in jail. How can I consider leaving this
country without money?”
11 The Netherlands requires family migrants to apply for a residence permit in their
country of origin. Deportees who are not considered a “security threat” are not prevented
from re-immigrating legally, provided that all admission requirements are met.
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Conclusion and Discussion
This study examines whether and how immigration deten-
tion—under conditions found in the Netherlands in 2011—
affects the willingness on the part of detainees to leave the terri-
tory of the detaining state, and whether eventual influences can
be regarded the product of deterrence. The analysis sheds light
on two types of “specific deterrence”; first, the possibility that
detainees are pressured into cooperating with the deportation
procedure and, second, the possibility that detainees are pres-
sured into leaving the country on their own, should they be
released because of a failed deportation procedure. The present
contribution focuses on stated preferences; it was not observed
whether respondents were cooperating with the deportation pro-
cedure or whether they actually went to a neighboring country
after a failed deportation procedure (various repeatedly detained
individuals did mention that they had done so after earlier deten-
tion periods). It should be remarked that an eventual preference
on the part of migrants to leave the country of the detaining state,
does not automatically translate into “permanent departure,” as
the administrative detention outcome also depends on supra-
individual factors, including the willingness by receiving states to
provide laissez passers (Ellermann 2008; Leerkes and Kox 2016).
Furthermore, migrants who are pressured into a preference to
“return” may start a new (illegal) migration project after having
been repatriated (Brotherton and Barrios 2011; Cardoso et al.
2016), while those who manage go to a third country may eventu-
ally come back to the country where they were detained, such as
when former detainees are returned to the “responsible country”
under the Dublin Regulation after having been apprehended else-
where in Europe.
A first main conclusion is that immigration detention seems to
be producing limited selective deterrent effects at the attitudinal
level. At the time of the interview, 17 out of 81 respondents
expressed a preference to go to their country of citizenship—in
some cases in hopes of starting a new (legal or illegal) migration
project from there—and in 16 cases that preference was reported
to have been coerced, at least in part, by detention, including
repeated detention. Additionally, the number of respondents pre-
ferring onward migration increased by seven when previous
detention periods are taken into consideration. These results are
obtained for a detention regime that is relatively punitive com-
paratively, especially in the European context given the relatively
long maximum and actual detention duration, and the common
practice of repeated detention.
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As expected, most respondents found the detention quite
painful, reflecting both Sykes’s classic “pains of imprisonment,”
Crewe’s (2011) “pains of uncertainty and indeterminacy,” and
what could perhaps be called the “pain of perceived illegitimacy,”
that is, the belief that one does not deserve immigration deten-
tion—either not at all, or not under conditions that characterized
the Dutch detention regime in 2011. Much in line with deter-
rence theory, respondents appeared to be making a kind of ratio-
nal decision by weighing the “costs” of immigration detention
against the “benefits” of a continued stay in the Netherlands or
Europe more generally. In most cases, however, the outcome of
that comparison turned out to be a persistent preference for con-
tinued stay; respondents’ interests in continuing their stay in the
Netherlands typically outweighed their interests in ending the
immigration detention experience—thus indicating strong
“threshold effects.” Deterrent effects were also found to be lim-
ited because the detention experience also triggers mechanisms
that actually reinforce a preference to stay. Some respondents,
who were afraid of the stigma of returning “empty handed,” rea-
soned that they actually needed to prolong their migration pro-
ject in order to make up for income that was lost during the
detention. Others received advice from other detainees on how
to resist deportation and/or on how to survive without a resident
permit more generally (see Campesi 2015). A low perceived legit-
imacy of the detention seemed to be reinforcing migrants’ prefer-
ences to stay as well; while the “pain of perceived illegitimacy”
sometimes added to a desire to leave the territory of the detain-
ing state, so as to end one’s exposure to it, it also triggered
resistance.
The nature of the interests offsetting the “costs” of immigra-
tion detention varied by migration motive. Respondents classified
as family migrants often persisted in a preference to stay due to
their family ties and socio-cultural attachment to Dutch society.
Asylum migrants emphasized safety concerns and an interest to
stay away from their country of citizenship. They were relatively
open to going to a different European country but found them-
selves being tied to the country of the first asylum application
because of the Dublin regulation. Respondents classified as labor
migrants were more likely to emphasize financial obstacles to
return.
A second conclusion is that the specific deterrent effects were
concentrated among labor migrants. Some of them brought pre-
existing return migration plans forward. Others hoped to be able
to evade repeated detention by seeking employment elsewhere in
Europe, should the deportation procedure fail. On average,
migrants classified as labor migrants seemed to have a weaker
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commitment to continued stay than family and asylum migrants,
but they also seemed to consider their detention somewhat more
legitimate, which brings us to our third and final main conclusion:
while all respondents who developed a preference to leave attrib-
uted these attitudinal changes to the perceived severity of the
detention and/or the risk of repeated detention, those developing
a preference to “return” to their country of citizenship were nota-
bly less negative about the outcome and/or process legitimacy of
the detention. That observation, which is consistent with defiance
theory (Sherman 1993), suggests that deterrent effects mostly
occur if some degree of perceived legitimacy is also present, and
that perhaps some degree of compliance would also have
occurred had the government used a “lighter” measure than
detention—or that such measures would actually have been more
effective, as they can be expected to perform better on perceived
process legitimacy. It also suggests that the distinction between
forced return and voluntary return is blurred in reality; there
may be a measure of (indirect) force in voluntary return, and a
trace of voluntariness in forced return. To the extent that
perceived severity and risk in the absence of some measure of
perceived legitimacy were capable of changing migration prefer-
ences, they mostly pressured detainees into a preference for
onward illegal migration to a different European country—thus
turning them into a kind of “fugitives” who contribute to a spatial
displacement of illegal residence.
In order to get a more complete picture of the operation and
effects of immigration detention, future research should try to
pay attention to both the detainee and the institutional level
(Leerkes and Kox 2016). The decisions that embassies and consu-
lates make on readmission seem to “dilute” the limited specific
deterrent effects at the attitudinal level. As was reported, over
two-thirds of the respondents were eventually released because of
a failed deportation procedure, including 10 of the 17 respond-
ents who preferred going to their country of citizenship. While
more research is urgently needed on how receiving states handle
requests by governments in the Global North to provide laissez
passers to undocumented migrants, a perceived legitimacy deficit
of deportation and immigration detention on their part—perhaps
in addition to critical assessments regarding the fairness of the
immigration policies of the Global North more generally—may
well be among the reasons for noncooperation. Another implica-
tion of these figures is that most respondents probably stayed in
Europe in a worse condition than in which they entered deten-
tion, also given the loss of employment that regularly came with it
and the health issues that were reported. One would hope that
such perverse outcomes create an interest on the part of detaining
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states to limit the punitive uses of immigration detention, and to
find other ways of dealing with the presence of noncitizens who
are formally deportable, but are difficult to deport in practice.
This contribution can be read as a case study on the social
operation of migration law, with a focus on deportation law. It
has broader scientific implications for the study of international
migration and legal compliance.
In a world in which international migration is increasingly
being regulated by states, it is crucial to obtain better insight in
how immigration regimes, including deportation regimes, codeter-
mine migration and mobility. In migration studies, the structuring
influence of “immigration law in action is undertheorized and
underresearched (see Massey et al. 2005; Massey 2015). So far,
most researchers interested in “policy effects” have implicitly or
explicitly limited themselves to economic (“rational choice”) com-
pliance models, and have mostly focused on migration decisions
taken in countries of origin, such as by asking whether apprehen-
sion risks at the U.S. border influence migration decisions (see for
example Cornelius and Salehyan 2007; Gathmann 2008; Massey
and Riosmena 2010). Ryo (2013) and others (Braithwaite 2010;
Van Alphen et al. 2013) have argued that in order to advance our
knowledge of contemporary migration, it is essential to incorporate
models of legal compliance that also pay attention to (non)compli-
ance on normative grounds. Ryo used a legal compliance frame-
work in order to understand the migration decisions of (potential)
migrants in Mexico; we use a similar lens to understand (changes
in) migration preferences among deportable migrants. Like Ryo,
we find that normative compliance models are important to con-
sider, but we also find that economic models certainly cannot be
disregarded. Future research could pay more attention to the com-
plex interrelationship between normative and economic dimen-
sions of compliance, including the possibility that deterrent
measures need to be perceived as (somewhat) legitimate in order
to be effective, and the tendency of deterrent measures to eventu-
ally undercut process legitimacy. While this contribution focuses on
migrants, it is also crucial to analyze how professionals working in
relevant institutions in the field of immigration law—such as
embassy personnel, immigration lawyers, (migration) police,
NGOs—structure migration patterns, using a similar lens.
A vast amount of scholarly work has enhanced our knowledge
of legal (non)compliance, but little is known on how people give
meaning and respond to the laws of foreign governments (see Ryo
2013)—especially when such laws mostly target them, as is the case
with immigration law. Existing models in socio-legal studies are
useful starting points, but some claims of the compliance literature
do not seem to hold, such as the central claim in criminal justice
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research that perceived process legitimacy is more influential than
perceived outcome legitimacy (see Tyler 2003). Compared to other
fields of law, there is less agreement that the content of immigra-
tion law is fair and serves the “common good.” Using two power-
ful sociological concepts by James Coleman (1990), one could say
that the laws in other fields usually resemble codified “conjoint
norms” where those targeted by the norm also benefit from the
norm being observed (say: “improved public safety”). Immigration
laws, by contrast, are more akin to “disjoint norms,” where those
targeted by a norm and those benefitting from it constitute differ-
ent groups. Immigration law benefits a substantial number of resi-
dence permit holders and those obtaining citizenship through
naturalization, but also is a repressive, protectionist instrument
that is designed to reduce migration, and that has the effect of
keeping a significant part of the migrants at the bottom of the
social hierarchy in a rather vulnerable position—without extend-
ing voting rights to them (also see De Genova 2002; Menjıvar and
Abrego 2012). As a consequence, the perceived outcome legiti-
macy of immigration law is much more contested and variant than
is found in other fields of law. The central importance of process
legitimacy in criminal justice research may well be due to per-
ceived outcome legitimacy being close to a constant there.
More generally, we need to better understand legitimacy
issues in immigration law. These need not only be addressed
from a formal-legal or normative-philosophical perspective; even-
tually, we also need to understand how migrants and other rele-
vant actors perceive the outcome and process legitimacy of
immigration law in countries of the Global North, how their
views are affected by the social structure and cultural factors, and
how these may be changing under the influence of globalization
and a rise of a global citizenship in countries in the Global South.
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